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BIOETHICS?  THE LAW AND 
BIOMEDICAL ADVANCE 
Roger B. Dworkin† 
MY FIRST EXPOSURE to what has come to be called “bio-
ethics” came from reading a remarkably prescient symposium in the 
UCLA Law Review in 1968.1  Beginning with a Foreword by Linus 
Pauling2 and a startling look at things to come by a UCLA psychia-
trist,3 the symposium considered topics as diverse as organ transplan-
tation4 and the rule against perpetuities.5 It contained an article about 
bioengineering6 as well as more fanciful articles.7  Importantly, the 
  
 † Robert A. Lucas Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law – 
Bloomington. 
 1 Symposium, Reflections on the New Biology, 15 UCLA L. REV. 267 
(1967-1968). 
 2 Linus Pauling, Foreword: Reflections on the New Biology, 15 UCLA L. 
REV. 267 (1967-1968) (discussing the legal impact of the discovery of the specific 
molecular structure of substances). 
 3 Roderic Gorney, The New Biology and the Future of Man, 15 UCLA L. 
REV. 273 (1967-1968) (noting that advances considered in the symposium articles 
constitute a new phase in human life in which man will take deliberate control over 
his own evolution, thereby necessitating a reworking of values for appropriate guid-
ance). 
 4 David Sanders & Jesse Dukeminier, Jr., Medical Advance and Legal Lag: 
Hemodialysis and Kidney Transplantation, 15 UCLA L. REV. 357 (1967-1968) (argu-
ing that current law prevents the medical community from fully utilizing cadaveric 
organs to save lives). 
 5 Daniel M. Schuyler, The New Biology and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 
15 UCLA L. REV. 420 (1967-1968) (urging that like “exotic” laws, venerable laws 
such as the Rule against Perpetuities need to be reformed to adapt to the possibilities 
of new biology). 
 6 Martin P. Golding, Ethical Issues in Biological Engineering, 15 UCLA L. 
REV. 443 (1967-1968) (favoring an approach in which geneticists control genetic 
engineering while adhering to publicity requirements and following the “first do no 
harm” principle). 
 7 See, e.g., John Batt, They Shoot Horses, Don’t They?: An Essay on the 
Scotoma of One-Eyed Kings, 15 UCLA L. REV. 510 (1967-1968) (using prose to 
caution society to fully consider the implications of biological advances before em-
bracing such changes); see also Curtis Henderson & Robert C.W. Ettinger, Cryonic 
Suspension and the Law, 15 UCLA L. REV. 414 (1967-1968) (discussing legal com-
plications concerning the definition of “life” that may arise from the cryogenic pres-
ervation of human bodies). 
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symposium also included two articles about the legal process – legal 
institutions and their ability to respond to biomedical developments.8 
Striking as it was in its farsightedness, the UCLA symposium in 
some ways anticipated not only the substance of “bioethics,” but also 
the nature of the literature.  For the most part the scholarly literature 
produced by legal academics has dealt with substantive issues.  Much 
of it has proceeded from clear value premises about what the “right” 
answer to some bio-social conundrum ought to be and has argued for 
Supreme Court decisions to support the author’s preferences, or legis-
lation to enshrine it.  The “ethical” analysis to support the substantive 
preference is often more assertion than analysis, and it often unques-
tioningly adopts some value (most often “autonomy”) and argues that 
the value supports its conclusion.  Only occasionally do we see seri-
ous attempts to explore the ability of legal institutions to cope with 
rapid change in biology and medicine. 
This seems a shame, but it is hardly surprising.  Bio-social issues 
are exciting; they stir the passions.  Who cannot get exercised about 
maternal choice versus fetal life, the respective “rights” of genetic and 
gestational mothers, whether suffering persons ought to be allowed to 
receive assistance in ending their lives, and whether we should create 
entire genetic twins of existing human beings?  Yet lawyers have 
nothing special to say about any of these matters.  If hired, a lawyer 
can advocate a position for a client.  An academic lawyer can develop 
arguments in articles and hope that practicing lawyers will find them 
useful and that courts will adopt them.  But there is nothing about 
legal training that makes a lawyer’s opinion about these issues any 
better than anybody else’s. 
The discipline that seems best equipped to evaluate bio-social 
questions is philosophy.  That is why the field is called bioethics.  
Ethics is a branch of philosophy  with a rich history, millennia of lit-
erature, and deep, fundamental disputes.  It is hard to do well.  Law-
yers are not trained to do it. 
Typical American law school curricula contain no courses on phi-
losophical ethics.  They usually offer an elective course on jurispru-
dence and maybe a specialized course on some type of jurisprudence 
(feminist jurisprudence, for example).  They also offer a course on 
  
 8 Warren E. Burger, Reflections on Law and Experimental Medicine, 15 
UCLA L. REV. 436 (1967-1968) (reflecting that the law should continue to develop 
techniques to meet new biological problems by adapting solid basic precedents to 
keep science within the bounds of societal acceptance).  See also Frank P. Grad, Leg-
islative Responses to the New Biology: Limits and Possibilities, 15 UCLA L. REV. 
480 (1967-1968) (asking generally whether or not technology and knowledge have 
advanced sufficiently for an appropriate legislative response). 
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“legal ethics,” which is usually as far removed from philosophy and 
surely as far away from biomedical developments as anything can be.  
If a lawyer has any sophistication in ethics, he or she gained it outside 
the legal academy. 
Bioethics, like all ethics, needs to be done by philosophers, per-
sons who know how to do it.  To the extent that lawyers claim to do 
bioethics they perform a disservice by claiming for themselves an 
expertise they lack and claiming for their work a value it does not 
possess.  Like everybody else, academic as well as practicing lawyers 
are free to hold and to espouse any positions they want.  That does not 
mean, however, that their positions are “bioethics” or reflect their 
expertise.9 
On the other hand, there are contributions that legally trained per-
sons can make to the pressing effort to deal with the social questions 
posed by biomedical advance.  Lawyers know one thing that nobody 
else knows.  They know how the system works.  Lawyers are experts 
at understanding legal institutions and how to use them.  Bringing that 
knowledge to bear on bio-social issues can make a real contribution. 
From the beginning, a small amount of legal commentary about 
bio-social issues has focused on issues of process.  In the UCLA sym-
posium, future Chief Justice Burger made an astounding claim: 
 
It should be understood that it is not the role and function of 
the law to keep fully in pace with science. Yet the law has 
demonstrated its capacity over the years to develop techniques 
to meet new problems . . . . 
. . . . 
 
Since law is no stranger to new problems, I venture to suggest 
that it will find solid basic precedents that can be adapted, 
within limits, to the problems of organ transplants, genetic 
modifications, and other problems.  Some of this will be by 
codes and acts of legislatures, but most of it will emerge 
slowly and cautiously in the courts by the application of old 
principles and techniques of the common law.  There can be 
  
 9 Years ago our faculty was interviewing a candidate for an entry level 
faculty appointment.  He was invited to dinner at a colleague’s house.  Among the 
other guests was a professor of philosophy.  During dinner the candidate asked the 
philosophy professor what he did.  The professor replied, “I’m a philosopher.”  
“Yeah, yeah,” the candidate said.  “We’re all philosophers.  I mean what do you do 
for a living?”  We are not all philosophers.  Some people—most of whom do it for a 
living—really are; they deserve the same respect that lawyers, physicians, physicists, 
and other professionals deserve for theirs. 
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no other way.  The law does not make discoveries as medicine 
and science do; it evolves slowly.  It responds rather than an-
ticipates.10 
 
“There can be no other way.”  Since first reading that sentence I 
have oscillated between condemning it as an example of arrogance 
and intellectual bankruptcy and thinking that, while overstated, it con-
tains a fairly large grain of truth.  Legislation is usually too clumsy 
and political to deal well with issues posed by fast-paced biomedical 
advance. The common law is, therefore, the preferred response unless 
and until it has been demonstrated to be incapable of dealing with a 
set of problems.  Yet the common law cannot always work.  To use 
one of Chief Justice Burger’s own examples, the common law has 
proved woefully inadequate to deal with issues of how to obtain 
enough organs for transplantation and how to allocate the organs we 
have.  Moreover, the suggestion that there can be no other way, which 
could be taken as arrogance, could also be read as an admission of 
defeat, as giving up.  
Perhaps there is utility in seeing whether there can be another 
way, in testing legal institutions and in trying to develop new ones to 
solve the problems with those that already exist.  Having made the 
effort, we may decide that there can be no other way (and that will 
teach us a great deal about the limits of law), but to assert the defeatist 
position without testing it seems sad indeed. 
My own work has primarily been directed toward this legal proc-
ess approach.  In this essay, however, I want to discuss using the so-
cial issues posed by biomedical advance as a device for teaching law 
students about the legal process. 
Law school curricula are made up of several kinds of courses.11  
By far the most numerous are doctrinal courses in which students are 
exposed to bodies of substantive law that are thought to cohere – 
Torts, Contracts, Property, Wills and Trusts, etc.  A second large 
group of courses is organized primarily around different types of pro-
cedure and procedural problems – Civil Procedure, Criminal Proce-
dure, Evidence, etc.  Third, a few courses proceed from the recogni-
tion that real persons do not have legal doctrines.  They have busi-
nesses they need to run, accidents to cope with, etc. all within the con-
  
 10 Burger, supra note 8, at 438-39. 
 11 For purposes of this essay I shall discuss only non-clinical courses.  This is 
not meant to denigrate the importance of clinical education, but simply to recognize 
that the clinical/non-clinical debate raises issues far beyond the scope of what we are 
discussing here. 
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text of some set of activities or some social condition.  These courses 
use the activity or condition as the organizational fulcrum and exam-
ine large bodies of law from multiple doctrinal areas to see how the 
law impinges on the activity or condition and how the activity or con-
dition affects the doctrine.  Such courses, which I call, “functional 
courses,” include, for example, Law and Medicine, Law and Educa-
tion, Sports Law, Women and the Law, Race and the Law, etc.  Some 
courses combine foci.  For example, Constitutional Law is a course 
about an area of substantive law (a doctrinal course) made by one 
legal institution with its own peculiar procedures (a procedural 
course).  And, of course, all courses involve some elements of doc-
trine, procedure, and function.12  The rough categories suggested here 
mean to suggest that different courses have different emphases, not 
that they have nothing in common. 
What is missing in all of this is courses that provide an overview, 
that allow the students to step back from the particular and to see the 
legal system as a whole.  Such an overview is important, not only to 
enrich students’ theoretical understanding, but to improve their skills 
as practicing lawyers.  A lawyer who knows what the system can and 
cannot do, who knows which parts of the system can do what, and 
who knows how to ask for something to maximize the chances of get-
ting it done is likely to be much more effective than a lawyer who 
cannot break free from the chains of Contracts or Torts. 
At the substantive level, the functional courses serve some of this 
overview function.  One hopes that a student who has studied Law 
and Medicine will understand that context matters and that cases in-
volving accidents arising out of automobile wrecks, baseball games, 
gunshots, and drownings will differ from each other even though they 
are all “Torts” cases in which liability is based in negligence, just as 
medical malpractice cases differ from other negligence cases. 
But far more important than a substantive overview is a proce-
dural overview.  If procedure is the one thing lawyers can claim to 
understand and use better than anybody else, if it is what separates us 
from laypersons, then we must in fact understand how the entire sys-
tem works, how each of its parts works, how the parts relate to the 
whole, and what are the benefits and shortcomings of each part of the 
system and of the system as a whole. 
This is hardly a new insight.  Hart and Saks had it fifty years 
ago.13  For a brief period of time teaching Legal Process using Hart 
  
 12 For example, I often claim that my Torts course is a running commercial 
for Civil Procedure, and the one mantra my Torts students learn is not, “Shift the 
loss,” or “Place the blame,” but “Procedure is everything.” 
 13 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
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and Saks was common in American law schools, and “Legal Process” 
became a legal sub-discipline, much like Law and Economics or Law 
and Society is today.  However, the legal process movement has fallen 
on hard times.  Not too many people teach it any more.  Why is that? 
I think it is because the subject, taken by itself, is too abstract for 
both teachers and students.  Thinking and teaching about the legal 
system abstracted from substance is both impossibly difficult and of 
questionable utility.  Studying it is horribly boring and invites the 
reaction that the subject is worthless. 
In large measure the problem stems from the original Hart and 
Saks teaching materials.  One of the great intellectual achievements in 
the history of legal scholarship, the materials are eminently unteach-
able.  They were organized around a series of problems that bore no 
apparent relation to each other and that required the student to con-
tinually learn new areas of substantive law and arcane facts in order to 
get the process point.  The problems were not even interesting.  They 
may have been intellectually interesting, but they had too little human 
interest to grab students’ attention.  The first, 59-page problem dealt 
with cantaloupes that rotted at a railroad siding and included pages of 
description of a disease of cantaloupes called “cladosporium rot.”14  
Nobody except cantaloupe farmers and shippers could be interested in 
that. 
In order to be taught in a way that students will care about and 
learn from, legal process lessons have to be placed into a substantive 
context.  It should be a (one) substantive context, so that the students 
do not have to be constantly diverted by learning new things that are 
largely unrelated to the point of the exercise.15  It should be an inher-
ently interesting substantive context so that the students do not mind 
reading about it.  Process points are inherently difficult and abstract.  
There is no harm in using a spoonful of sugar to make the medicine go 
down.  Of course the substantive focus must be broad and complex 
  
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & 
Philip P. Frickey eds., Foundation Press 1994) (1958). 
 14 See id. at 10-68 (using a dispute over spoiled cantaloupes to illustrate the 
significance of legal institutional systems and processes). 
 15 One context does not mean one body of doctrine. See, e.g., MARC A. 
FRANKLIN, THE DYNAMICS OF AMERICAN LAW: COURTS, THE LEGAL PROCESS AND 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1968). Franklin, who has taught Legal Process in law 
school, prepared an undergraduate legal process teaching book that focused on issues 
in communications including defamation issues, other free speech issues of constitu-
tional dimension, and legislative and administrative regulation of the communications 
industry.  There were many doctrinal foci, but the way the legal system deals with 
communication was the substantive link that tied the process points together. 
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enough that it permits exploring a fairly full range of legal process 
lessons. 
Biomedical advance is an almost perfect substantive context for 
teaching legal process.  The issues posed are inherently interesting 
and highly controversial.  They permit the students to see the proc-
esses of law attempt to come to grips with legal problems at various 
stages of the problems’ development.  They raise issues that have 
been dealt with by each of the system’s processes.  They are big and 
complex enough to fill a course, but closely enough related to make 
treatment in one three-semester-hour course feasible.  Finally, they 
teach lessons that are relevant far beyond the field of law and bio-
medical advance. 
Almost everything in the field flows from Roe v. Wade.16  There-
fore, one can begin the course by exploring the wisdom of using the 
law’s most extreme tools to deal with a problem.  Abortion law is the 
story of attempting to use one legal weapon of mass destruction (con-
stitutional adjudication) to try to undo the devastation wrought by its 
other WMD (the criminal law).  Unlike a substantive discussion of 
abortion, focusing on the processes of constitutional adjudication and 
criminal law allows the students to consider the issues calmly and to 
permit meaningful discussion in class.  Anti-abortion partisans may 
begin to see that criminalizing everything that one disapproves of may 
not be a very good idea.  Pro-choice advocates may begin to wonder 
whether their movement would be better off today if it had allowed 
legislative reform to run its course, rather than insisting on a constitu-
tional victory.  The limits of the criminal law, when to use and when 
not to use it and the limits of constitutional law, and when to use and 
not to use it can all be explored.  The characteristics of the abortion 
problem can be placed side by side with the characteristics of consti-
tutional adjudication to see why a constitutional approach may not 
have been the best one from the point of view of those who sought it.  
This presents a methodology for considering whether to use constitu-
tional adjudication to deal with other issues and suggests to students 
who are interested in careers in legal reform that going for ultimate 
victory may lead to a Pyrrhic one.  If a lawyer can counsel a client out 
of an extreme, superficially attractive approach and into a moderate, 
less glitzy one that will actually provide more relief, then that lawyer 
has done the highest kind of professional service and really has used 
the knowledge that makes lawyers special, knowledge about the legal 
system, in the service of a client. 
  
 16 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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One can test all of this and drive the lessons home by comparing 
the efforts to deal constitutionally with sterilization with the much 
more sensible efforts stemming from the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton’s moderate approach in Guardianship of Hayes.17  One can teach 
the magnificently instructive case, Conservatorship of Valerie N.,18 in 
which the competing claims were that a developmentally disabled 
person has a constitutional right to be sterilized and a constitutional 
right not to be sterilized, to demonstrate the folly of elevating every 
issue to a constitutional level.  Sterilization is also a useful topic for 
discussion because, as the competing positions in Valerie N. indicate, 
sterilization is perceived as a bad thing to those who are getting it and 
a good thing to those who are denied it.19  This foreshadows the death 
and dying discussion where the same paradox exists and is a phe-
nomenon that is common in the law.20 
Discussion of abortion and sterilization, which offers a wonderful 
look at the relative virtues of thinking big and thinking small, can 
profitably be followed by considering issues of assisted reproduction.  
Here the common law (the paradigmatic legal example of thinking 
small) has proved remarkably successful from everybody’s point of 
view—mothers, husbands, children, donors and donors’ wives, doc-
tors and male doctors’ wives, and the state—in dealing with issues of 
artificial insemination by donor (AID) of married women whose hus-
bands have consented to the procedure.  It also has been relatively 
successful in dealing with artificial insemination issues that arise 
when the technique is used in less conventional settings, for example 
as a device to permit lesbians to have children.  Legislation, both real 
and model, has made a hash of these issues despite trying to serve the 
same policies as the courts.  The question that all of this poses is 
whether the same experience can be expected with other techniques of 
assisted reproduction, like surrogate motherhood and in vitro fertiliza-
  
 17 608 P.2d 635 (Wash. 1980) (creating judicial standards for sterilization of 
a mentally incompetent minor, including among other things: appointing a guardian 
ad litem, examining medical evidence of incapacity, and proving that sterilization 
would be in the child’s best interest). 
 18 707 P.2d 760 (Cal. 1985) (holding that California statute prohibiting ster-
ilization of person under conservatorship impermissibly deprives developmentally 
disabled persons of privacy and liberty interest protected by the State and Federal 
Constitutions). 
 19 Id. at 771 (noting that appellant’s argument that the statute deprives Val-
erie of her right of procreative choice conflicts with appellee’s argument that statute 
furthers that right by protecting her from sterilization). 
 20 Another example is the area of human experimentation where women and 
members of minority groups argue simultaneously that they are discriminated against 
by being used and by not being used as human subjects. 
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tion.  If not, what is the difference between the situations that makes 
common law work better in one setting than the other?  Can one take 
generalizable lessons away from the comparison? 
Common law courts have been reluctant to label the offspring of 
AID of married women whose husbands consented to the procedure as 
“legitimate,”21 but in every case that has arisen, they have reached the 
same result that would have been reached in a case involving the 
clearly legitimate child of a married couple.22  This gives children two 
sources of financial and emotional support and a “father figure” in 
their lives.  It gives husbands both the benefits and detriments of par-
enthood, which is appropriate, given their conscious role in the proc-
ess.  It gives wives a source of support for their child and treats them 
the same as any other wife and mother would be treated in a divorce 
case.  It imposes no parental obligations on doctors, donors, or their 
wives.  And it maximizes the state’s chance to avoid having to support 
the child by obligating both the husband and the wife, rather than just 
the wife, to do so.  Yet, by refusing to attach a label to the child or to 
make a definitive ruling about the husband’s or donor’s status, the 
courts have left themselves free to reach different results in cases 
whose facts are different and seem to call for different outcomes.23 
Both real legislatures and the Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws have attempted to achieve the same results for individuals and 
the states while providing a measure of certainty that common law 
development does not provide.  As I have noted elsewhere,24 the re-
sults have been confusing at best, counterproductive at worst.  Statutes 
have turned women who inseminate themselves into felons;25 made 
the husband-child relationship either turn on whether sperm from a 
third party was donated (given for free) or required courts to avoid 
that construction and decide cases as a matter of common law;26 and 
  
 21 ROGER B. DWORKIN, LIMITS: THE ROLE OF THE LAW IN BIOETHICAL 
DECISION MAKING 64 (1996) [hereinafter LIMITS]. 
 22 Id. 
 23 See id. at 64-65 (using–in the absence of laws legitimizing children born 
from AID via their mothers’  husbands–the hypothetical of forcing Nobel Laureate 
sperm donors to support children conceived with their sperm as a way for the Court to 
discourage positive eugenics). 
 24 See id. at 65-69 (noting, for example, that Georgia’s statutes are unclear as 
to what type of written consent will relieve a doctor from liability and whether this is 
a complete or partial bar to liability). 
 25 Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 43-34-42 (2002) (making it a felony for any 
non-physician, non-surgeon to perform artificial insemination), with McIntyre v. 
Crouch, 780 P.2d 239, 243 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (explaining that a woman who in-
seminates herself is only guilty of a misdemeanor).  See generally LIMITS, supra note 
21, at 66, for a discussion of this phenomenon. 
 26 See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 407 (1973) (stating that if 
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spoken in such convoluted language that they have raised serious 
questions about whether they apply only to cases involving the hus-
band’s rights and obligations or also the child’s.27 
Similarly, in cases involving artificial insemination of unmarried 
and lesbian women, courts have adopted pragmatic, practical ap-
proaches that seem to make sense for the parties, while legislatures 
have adopted hard and fast rules that often lead to senseless results.  
For example, in cases involving known donors and lesbian mothers, 
courts have made questions of the donor’s rights to custody and visita-
tion depend upon facts such as the amount of involvement the donor 
has had in the life of the child; the nature of their relationship; 
whether the donor is paying child support; and the mother’s behav-
ior.28  They have been reluctant to treat mothers’ lesbian partners as 
“parents,” but they have protected their interests by assuring that they 
have visitation rights, that the child is accessible to them, etc.29  In a 
messy and unpleasant situation, that is about the best one can do.  The 
Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act, on the other 
hand, would simply eliminate any parental claims of the donor regard-
less of the facts of the particular case.30  That represents the triumph 
of ideology and the quest for certainty over good sense.  Moreover, 
the ideology is not clear, as the drafters state that their goal is to pro-
mote the best interests of children,31 but in many cases cutting one 
parent out of a child’s life is not best for that child. 
Why has the common law worked so much better than legislation 
in dealing with legal issues raised by artificial insemination?  I would 
  
husband consents to wife’s artificial insemination by non-husband donor semen, then 
husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father); see also R.S. v. R.S., 670 
P.2d 923 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that father who consents to heterologous 
insemination of wife is treated legally as the natural father of the child and must up-
hold his responsibilities as such). 
 27 See, e.g., LIMITS, supra note 21, at 67 (noting that even the model statutes 
have language that creates inconsistent results when practically applied to a case). 
 28 See, e.g., Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 536 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1986) (holding that the court’s ruling did not infringe upon any right of two women to 
family autonomy, because semen donor was never excluded as a member of the fam-
ily by anonymity, by agreement, or by the parties’ conduct). 
 29 See, e.g., id. at 537 (refusing to determine whether lesbian partner was a de 
facto parent, court recognized previously granted visitation rights); see also In re 
LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151, 161 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that 
standing as a parent is irrelevant to custody statute and noting that the best interests of 
the child is always the overriding consideration in custody decisions, therefore, les-
bian partner could seek joint custody). 
 30 UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT § 4 (withdrawn 
2000), 9C U.L.A. 363, 371 (Supp. 2003). 
 31 Id. at 364-65. 
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suggest that the explanation lies in the fact that conduct control is not 
an important priority in this setting; that no social problem of magni-
tude is involved; that nothing that would disable judges from handling 
the problems exists; that sensible results are highly fact dependent; 
and that the issues are analogous to those with which the courts have 
been dealing for centuries.  That is, I am not aware of anybody who 
thinks that artificial insemination should be prevented or strictly con-
trolled, something courts could not do well.  Artificial insemination 
poses no major crisis for the nation to which the law must respond.  
No scientific or other expertise that judges lack is needed to resolve 
the cases.  Sound results in human relationship cases depend on the 
infinitely variable facts of human relationships.  And issues of cus-
tody, child support, visitation, etc. are the kinds of issues courts have 
long known how to resolve. 
The legislatures, on the other hand, have sought to impose one-
size-fits-all, certain solutions on areas where certainty is not only un-
necessary, but undesirable; and they have responded to imaginary 
problems (like the nonexistent health problems of women inseminat-
ing themselves) by ignoring the first rule of sound law making: if it 
ain’t broke, don’t fix it. 
Would one expect the same results when one considers other 
forms of assisted reproduction, such as surrogate motherhood and in 
vitro fertilization?  That depends on whether one thinks that conduct 
control is important in those areas.  If it is, the common law will not 
work.  If it is not, then the common law can be expected to do well 
with fact-centered, human relations issues of the type that courts have 
long dealt with and that require no scientific expertise for their resolu-
tion. 
Some persons think that conduct control is important in the area 
of surrogate motherhood in order to avoid the evils of baby selling, 
economic and psychological exploitation of women, demeaning 
women by treating them as things, and the placement of children 
without regard to their interests.  Others disagree, thinking that the 
evils of baby selling do not exist in the surrogacy context, that eco-
nomic and psychological concerns are overstated and would only ap-
ply in some cases anyway, that refusing to allow women to serve as 
surrogates, rather than using them, would demean women by denying 
their ability to make rational choices, and that surrogacy is no differ-
ent than artificial insemination in terms of not considering the inter-
ests of children.  If one holds the first set of views, then legislation is 
necessary to avoid the evils one fears.  If one agrees with the second 
set of positions, then the common law will work fine.  Here substan-
tive views determine sound institutional choices. 
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However, even if one is committed to the need for legislation, one 
should make sure that the legislation serves the needs that gave rise to 
it.  Once again, the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Concep-
tion Act disappoints.  Rather than offer a uniform statute, the Com-
missioners provided two choices, one outlawing surrogacy and one 
regulating it.32 That makes no sense.  Either surrogacy should be 
banned for the reasons suggested above, or the problems with it are 
too trivial to require regulation.  If the latter is the case, then all the 
Uniform Act does is create pitfalls and possibilities of unimportant 
errors that will upset people’s plans.  No justification for doing that 
exists. 
The state courts have dealt with surrogate motherhood as one 
would expect—demonstrating their ineptitude in dealing with conduct 
control while sorting out human relationships reasonably well.  The 
leading example is the famous New Jersey case, Matter of Baby M.33  
The New Jersey Supreme Court was appalled by surrogate mother-
hood, or at least by surrogate motherhood for a fee, for the typical 
reasons mentioned above.  Therefore, it sought to prevent the practice.  
Lacking the legislature’s authority to simply prohibit the practice, the 
court tried to achieve its goal by declaring surrogacy contracts void.34 
That was a serious mistake as it made the contracts of no effect.  That 
means that the surrogate cannot enforce the contract against an unwill-
ing intended father who refuses to pay the surrogate’s fee or medical 
expenses, or to accept the child.  For a court that was largely con-
cerned with protecting surrogates and potential surrogates, that is a 
singularly perverse result.35 
There are two important lessons for the students here.  First courts 
do not do well when they try to do what a legislature is made to do – 
make people act in a certain way.  Second, even if the court could not 
achieve its conduct control goal, it could have done a better job of 
achieving its policy goal by thinking small.  If the court had declared 
the contract voidable at the instance of the surrogate, rather than void, 
surrogates would be protected both by being allowed to avoid contrac-
tual obligations that the court thought were inappropriate and by being 
  
 32 Compare id. § 5 at 383 (declaring surrogacy agreements void as “Alterna-
tive B”), with id. §§ 5-9 at 373-382 (describing a framework for lawful surrogacy 
agreements as “Alternative A”). 
 33 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
 34 Id. at 1234 (holding a surrogacy contract invalid as a violation of public 
policy). 
 35 LIMITS, supra note 21, at 75. 
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able to receive contractual benefits if they chose to do so.  Thinking 
small almost always works better than thinking big. 
In the human relationships area, on the other hand, the court did 
fine.  It applied the legislative standard to refuse to terminate the sur-
rogate mother’s parental rights; it did a best interests of the child 
analysis to determine custody; and it recognized and protected the 
non-custodial parent’s interest in visitation.  This treated the child as 
well as children in disputed parentage/custody disputes are ordinarily 
treated, recognized the competing needs of the adults involved, and 
reached the kind of compromise that will not make any of the adults 
totally happy.  This made surrogacy not terribly attractive to anybody, 
which fostered the court’s own anti-surrogacy views and probably did 
the best thing for a society in the early stages of debate about a new 
biomedical possibility—slowing the technique down so that it will not 
do too much harm, while allowing it to proceed so that the society will 
not lose too much good. 
The same lessons can be pursued and driven home by discussing 
the surrogacy cases in which there is a question about who is a mother 
and the in vitro fertilization cases.  One can also add new lessons as 
one goes.  For example, one can use Johnson v. Calvert36 to teach that 
a court can guarantee an outcome by adopting one substantive test or 
leave future courts free to reach the right result on particular facts by 
adopting a different one.  In Johnson, where one woman provided an 
ovum, and a different woman carried the pregnancy to term, the ma-
jority applied an “intending mother” test to hold that the ovum pro-
vider was the mother of the resulting child.37  The dissent applied a 
best interest of the child test.38  As the dissent correctly pointed out,39 
the ovum provider will win every case under an “intending mother” 
test.  Therefore, the result of adopting that test is to treat the claims of 
the gestational mother as of no value.  Under a “best interests of the 
child” test, on the other hand, one cannot predict in advance how a 
case will come out, and the genetic mother and the gestational mother 
each has an opportunity to be treated as a legal mother.  Learning that 
one can control outcomes by adopting apparently abstract tests is an 
important and generalizable lesson. 
  
 36 851 P.2d 776, 783 (Cal. 1993) (holding that in deciding the question of 
motherhood, the parities’ intentions at the time they enter a surrogacy contract should 
control), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 874 (1993), and cert. dismissed sub nom. Baby Boy J. 
v. Johnson, 510 U.S. 938 (1993). 
 37 Id. at 782. 
 38 Id. at 799-801 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
 39 Id. at 797. 
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The material on assisted reproduction leads naturally to a consid-
eration of genetics.  Here discussion can begin with the wrongful birth 
and wrongful life cases40 to illustrate again the ability of the common 
law to respond to new challenges when conduct control is not impor-
tant, scientific knowledge is not essential to reaching sound results, 
and there is a rich background of common law doctrine within which 
to locate the new cases. 
This does not mean that the courts get every case right.  There are 
not very many areas in which they do that.  It means only that their 
errors are simply mistakes rather than the inevitable errors that would 
flow from using the wrong institutional response. 
For example, in Howard v. Lecher41 the New York Court of Ap-
peals denied emotional distress damages to the mother of a child born 
with Tay Sachs disease.42  The court held that the only injury was to 
the child and that the allegedly negligent obstetrician owed no duty to 
the mother because she was a mere bystander at the birth of her 
child.43 This ridiculous result can be explained by focusing on courts’ 
traditional reluctance to award emotional distress damages in cases 
not involving physical injury to the plaintiff and on New York’s ab-
surd “bystander” rule for dealing with such cases.  Another court with 
a different view could easily have reached the opposite result.  After 
all, to whom does an obstetrician owe a duty if not to his or her pa-
tient, the mother, and what is the likelihood that a mother’s claims of 
emotional distress are fabricated in a case involving the birth of a 
child with a horrible, fatal genetic disease? 
For the most part, however, the courts have dealt reasonably well 
with issues of wrongful birth and life, which fit relatively comfortably 
into established tort law parameters.  Thus, they have recognized par-
ents’ rights to recover for the avoidable birth of a child with serious 
genetic birth defects,44 they have wrestled uncomfortably with the 
question of the child’s right to recover,45 they have been careful to 
  
 40 While the terminology makes absolutely no difference, the convention is 
to call cases brought by parents of “defective” children to recover for the parents’ 
damages, actions for “wrongful birth,” and to call cases brought on behalf of the 
child, “wrongful life” cases. 
 41 366 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1977). 
 42 Id. at 66. 
 43 Id. (explaining that no cause of action exists for emotional distress caused 
by a reaction to the direct injury suffered by another). 
 44 See, e.g., Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 957, 966 (Cal. 1982) (noting that 
a majority of recent cases have permitted parents to recover at least some damages in 
wrongful birth actions, and holding that children should also be able to recover lim-
ited damages). 
 45 See id. at 957-59 for a general discussion. 
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avoid over compensation by refusing to award the same damages to 
both parents and children,46 and they have begun to struggle with the 
question of what negligence means in the medical genetics context.47  
This is the way in which tort law usually evolves to meet problems 
caused by emerging technologies, and the differences between genetic 
medicine and conventional medicine48 can readily be handled within 
the fact-sensitive approach of the common law. 
After discussing the wrongful birth and life cases one can spend 
whatever time one thinks appropriate discussing other practical prob-
lems that confront health professionals in a genetic practice—for ex-
ample, questions about what unsought information (like fetal sex or 
XYY status) must be disclosed and to whom the information must be 
disclosed (non-paternity to a husband?  risk of bearing a child with a 
genetic disease to a sibling?  potential dangerousness to an employer?)  
I think these are useful subjects to discuss because they illustrate how 
different genetic medicine is from other medicine because genetic 
medicine necessarily involves more than one person in addition to the 
health professional and usually involves discovering more information 
than one was looking for.  This presents an opportunity to consider 
whether those different features of genetic medicine render analogies 
to traditional medical cases inapt and require a new institutional re-
sponse or just new doctrinal developments from the common law 
courts. 
Of course, modern genetics involves more than practical problems 
for practitioners and patients.  Issues of gene therapy and genetic re-
search, including research into cloning and stem cells, must be exam-
ined.  These issues cannot simply be resolved by the common law.  
Sound resolution depends, in large part, on scientific understanding, 
understanding that experts in the field are only beginning to develop 
and that courts cannot have.  It also requires making fundamental 
judgments about whether certain kinds of work are to be prohibited, 
  
 46 Id. at 965-66 (explaining that courts cannot permit double recovery of 
medical expenses). 
 47 Compare, e.g., Pratt v. Univ. of Minn. Affiliated Hosp. & Clinics, 403 
N.W.2d 865, 867-70 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that genetic counseling is treat-
ment within the doctrine of negligent nondisclosure), with Pratt v. Univ. of Minn. 
Affiliated Hosp. & Clinics, 414 N.W.2d 399 (Minn. 1987) (reversing the Court of 
Appeals and ruling that diagnosing a condition does not give rise to a duty to disclose 
risks inherent in undiagnosed conditions). 
 48 For example, genetic medicine inevitably involves multiple persons, 
thereby making it hard to know to whom the doctor owes a duty; genetic medicine 
often affects the unborn; genetic “treatment” is still largely limited to talking to peo-
ple, explaining options to them, thus raising the question of whether genetic malprac-
tice is more similar to conventional malpractice cases or to informed consent cases. 
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discouraged, regulated, permitted without regulation, or encouraged—
in other words, questions of conduct control. 
A brief look reveals that not only the courts, but also the legisla-
tures, lack the competence to deal with gene therapy, cloning, and 
stem cell research. The science is too uncertain, and both the possible 
benefits and the possible physical and moral risks of the techniques 
are too speculative to justify the kind of definitive, across-the-board 
answers that legislation provides.  Rather, these developments invite 
consideration of the administrative law process and of the develop-
ment of new legal institutions. 
At first blush, administrative response to these technologies seems 
appropriate.  An administrative response is supposed to combine ex-
pertise, informality, regulation (conduct control), narrow application 
(controlling specific conduct, not conduct across-the-board), and the 
possibility of positive reactions (for example funding) rather than 
penalties and stigmatization as a way to control behavior.  On the 
other hand, many will find the risks of capture of the process by the 
experts it is supposed to control, complexity, bureaucratic wrangling, 
legislative interference, and judicial review sufficient to disqualify 
agencies from responding well to the issues.  Of course, the teacher 
should be careful to discuss the facts of gene therapy, cloning, and 
stem cell research to the extent that they are known in order to see 
whether administrative law will work better for one or more of the 
developments than for the others. 
Finally, if administrative agencies are not well designed to deal 
with some of the issues posed, then one should consider the develop-
ment of new institutions.  This requires first identifying exactly what 
the deficiencies of existing institutions for dealing with specific prob-
lems are; second, formulating the characteristics that a new institution 
should possess in order to overcome those deficiencies; and third, 
grappling with questions about who would create the new institution, 
what branch of government would it be in, how one can assure its 
legitimacy, how can one avoid the problems of excessive judicial and 
legislative involvement that have plagued administrative agencies, 
etc.49  This is an explicit effort to deal with then Judge Burger’s asser-
tion that, “There can be no other way.”50 
Having used abortion, sterilization, assisted reproduction, genetic 
medicine, and genetic research to explore issues of institutional com-
  
 49 I am trying to make a preliminary effort to deal with these questions.  See 
Roger B. Dworkin, Anything New Under the Sun?:  Designing Legal Institutions to 
Deal with Biomedical Advance (forthcoming). 
 50 See Burger, supra note 8, at 439. 
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petence, one can end the course by considering issues of death and 
dying.  This is good review and summary material. 
The old debate about the definition of death51 is useful for repris-
ing themes of certainty versus flexibility and legislation versus com-
mon law development.  In this context it is useful to remind students 
about the power of language: The nasty word for “certainty” is “rigid-
ity;” the nasty word for “flexibility” is “uncertainty.”  Almost every 
student I know favors flexible certainty.  Unfortunately, there is no 
such thing. 
Much more important than the definition of death is the question 
of expediting or facilitating death.  Once again one can call the stu-
dents’ attention to the dangerous potential of terminology to control 
outcomes.  It is essential to teach them to avoid getting hung up on 
debates about what “euthanasia” really means and to eschew the quick 
fixes that terms like “ordinary” and “extraordinary” care seem to of-
fer. 
One can begin studying death facilitation by considering the pre-
1976 state of affairs.  All forms of death facilitation were felonies, yet 
no health care provider had ever been convicted of any crime growing 
out of death facilitating behavior despite its widespread practice.  This 
gives the teacher a chance to reprise the lessons about the limits of the 
criminal sanction, to explore (or at least speculate about) the reasons 
for the split between the law as written and the law as applied, and to 
emphasize the importance of discretion in the legal system.  One can 
raise the question of whether the written law-applied law gulf repre-
sented the abnegation of the rule of law or law operating at its sophis-
ticated best. 
Reformers and certainty seekers did not think that the pre-1976 
situation was optimal.  They pursued both judicial and legislative re-
form.  Most of the development has been at the state level, although 
many state courts have attempted to resolve the issues as issues of 
federal constitutional law,52 and the Supreme Court has been unable to 
  
 51 Compare, e.g., Roger B. Dworkin, Death in Context, 48 IND. L.J. 623, 
638-39 (1973) (arguing that the law should not have a unitary definition for death, but 
rather, should describe the circumstances under which particular consequences flow), 
with Alexander Morgan Capron & Leon R. Kass, A Statutory Definition of the Stan-
dards for Determining Human Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal, 121 U. PA. L. 
REV. 87 (1972-1973) (proposing a model definition of death based on standards of 
respiratory and circulatory cessation and possibly on the reversible cessation of spon-
taneous brain functions). 
 52 E.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 660-64 (N.J. 1976) (contemplating 
federal constitutional issues such as the free exercise of religion, cruel and unusual 
punishment, and the right to privacy), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. N.J., 429 U.S. 
922 (1976). 
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resist entering the fray.53  The courts have been beset from the begin-
ning by the fact that death, like sterilization, is a bad thing for those 
who are “getting” it and a good thing for those who are not.  As with 
the Valerie N. sterilization case,54 two competing values of alleged 
constitutional dimension are at stake, the right to live and an asserted 
right to die.  In addition, the almost infinite factual variety of death 
facilitation cases, the impossibility of dealing soundly with them 
unless one understands the science surrounding each patient’s situa-
tion, the evolving nature of the science, widespread moral disagree-
ment about some forms of death facilitation, and the desire to control 
conduct make it plain that constitutional adjudication cannot provide 
optimal solutions to the issues. 
This is not the place for a major analysis of the death facilitation 
cases.  However, the lack of fit between constitutional adjudication 
and death facilitation issues can be seen by looking briefly at some of 
the judicial developments to date. 
First, all the early cases considered whether to allow life sustain-
ing treatment to be withdrawn from mentally incompetent persons.  
Focusing on “rights” led the courts astray.  If a right exists, they rea-
soned, it must belong to everybody.55  It would be wrong to deny the 
right to incompetent persons because that would demean persons with 
handicaps.56 Therefore, in cases involving incompetent persons the 
courts first decided what rights a competent person would have and 
then sought to provide the same rights to an incompetent person.57 
This is both unworkable and offensive.  It is unworkable because 
many American rights, including the right to reject medical care, are 
premised on an ability to make choices.  Incompetent persons cannot 
make meaningful choices.  Thus, they cannot have the same rights as 
competent persons.  Pretending that they do requires courts to create a 
fiction and then to construct elaborate procedures and substantive 
standards to appear to apply the same right to competent and incom-
  
 53 E.g., Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (using an equal protection 
analysis to address assisted suicide statutes); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 
(1997) (using a due process analysis to address assisted suicide statutes); see also 
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (ruling on a family’s right 
to remove artificial hydration and nutrition from a mentally incompetent person). 
 54 707 P.2d at 771. 
 55 See, e.g., LIMITS, supra note 21, at 117. 
 56 Cf. David Randolph Smith, Legal Recognition of Neocortical Death, 71 
CORNELL L. REV. 850, 861 n.49 (1986) (citing case law affirming the privacy rights of 
incompetent persons). 
 57 E.g., Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663-64; see also Superintendent of Belcher-
town State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431 (Mass. 1977); In re Spring, 405 
N.E.2d 115, 119 (Mass. 1980).  
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petent persons.58 In fact, of course, the incompetent person, who is 
unable to choose, has someone else choose for him or her, and in the 
name of the incompetent person’s rights, somebody else’s choices are 
imposed upon him or her. 
Sometimes this leads to truly ugly results.  For example, in the 
tragic Massachusetts case, Matter of Spring, the court authorized an 
annoying, sick old man, who had never expressed any views about 
whether there were conditions in which he would prefer not to live, to 
be killed by his family members because he had a “right” not to have 
medical care forced upon him.59 
In addition to leading to bad results, treating incompetent persons 
as if they were competent in the name of their dignity and their rights 
is offensive in another way.  Far from respecting the dignity of per-
sons with disabilities, this approach demeans disabled persons by re-
quiring the law to ignore what is probably the most significant feature 
of the person’s life and forcing the disabled person into a model of 
what a person “should” be like—us, the non-disabled.  How that pro-
motes the dignity of persons with disabilities I do not know. 
A second illustration of the absence of fit between constitutional 
adjudication and death facilitation lies in the courts’ efforts to distin-
guish withholding and withdrawing medical care from physician as-
sisted suicide and euthanasia.  By now the right to have even life sus-
taining medical care withheld or withdrawn in certain circumstances 
is widely recognized.60  The Supreme Court has said that the existence 
of such a right could be inferred from its decisions,61 and it has as-
sumed for the sake of argument that the right includes a right to have 
artificial nutrition and hydration withdrawn under some circum-
stances.62 Nonetheless, great reluctance still exists to permitting as-
sisted suicide or euthanasia. 
One state, Oregon, has legislatively authorized physician assisted 
suicide.63  No state court has recognized a right to assisted suicide, 
and no state has authorized euthanasia.  At the human level this is 
easy to understand.  It feels like there is a difference between not 
  
 58 See, e.g., Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664 (noting the “sad truth” of Quinlan’s 
incompetence); Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 431 (Mass. 1977) (reciting the history be-
hind the substituted judgment doctrine). 
 59 405 N.E.2d at 122. 
 60 See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277 n.6 (1990), for 
a collection and summary of cases relating to withdrawal of life sustaining medical 
treatment. 
 61 Id. at 278. 
 62 Id. at 279. 
 63 Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-.897 (2001). 
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treating a person on the one hand and providing the person with the 
means of self destruction or even applying the means oneself on the 
other.  Every doctor I have discussed this with over the last thirty 
years has felt this distinction deeply. 
Yet at the level of principle the distinction is unsound, and princi-
ple is the only level at which the Constitution can meaningfully re-
spond.  The proffered distinctions are well known: commission versus 
omission, death caused by the underlying condition versus death 
caused by an external agent, a long tradition that supports rejecting 
unwanted medical care versus no such tradition supporting assisted 
suicide or euthanasia, the fear that euthanasia or assisted suicide will 
lead to abusive killings (as if withholding or withdrawing care will 
not).  Whether any or all of these distinctions are persuasive, none of 
them rests on any principle.  One could construct a principle that 
would justify recognizing a right to have medical care withheld or 
withdrawn, but that principle would equally include assisted suicide 
and euthanasia.  The principle, of course, would be bodily autonomy – 
the right to have done with one’s body what one wants and the right to 
make significant decisions about one’s own body.  This is also the 
only coherent principle that could underlie a right to abortion.  How-
ever, this principle would also support assisted suicide and euthanasia.  
The Supreme Court knows that.  That is why in the physician assisted 
suicide cases the Court specifically rejected the notion that autonomy 
is a constitutionally protected principle, rejected all principle, and 
based its distinction of the constitutional status of withholding and 
withdrawing care and assisted suicide on tradition.64 
This substitution of tradition for principle makes a mockery of 
constitutional adjudication.  Traditions are where one finds them.  
How traditional must a practice be for it to be constitutionally en-
shrined?  The tradition opposing abortion was 150 years old and na-
tionwide at the time of Roe v. Wade.  Why was that not enough to 
deny a constitutional abortion right if a less firmly entrenched tradi-
tion was enough to deny such a right to assisted suicide?  The point 
here is not to argue about whether Roe or the assisted suicide cases 
reached socially desirable results.  The point is that both of them de-
meaned the Supreme Court by having it do what lesser courts could 
do and left us with no ability to use its decisions to reason our way to 
other decisions.  If Supreme Court decisions stand for their results and 
nothing more, then the Supreme Court truly is susceptible to the criti-
cism of its political enemies that all it does is to enshrine the prefer-
  
 64 Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. at 799-809; see also Washington, 521 U.S. at 
710-28. 
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ences of five of its members.  If the existence or nonexistence of a 
constitutional right to withholding or withdrawing medical care, as-
sisted suicide, or euthanasia cannot be resolved at the level of princi-
ple, then it ought not to be resolved by the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court seems to have learned part of this lesson, per-
haps from its thirty years of experience with Roe v. Wade.  As already 
noted,65 in its first “right to die” case the Court did not hold that any 
death related right exists; it merely said that such a right could be in-
ferred from prior decisions, assumed that the right would include a 
right to reject artificial nutrition and hydration, and then held that 
Missouri had strong enough state interests to justify denying the right 
in the circumstances of that case.66  Even in the assisted suicide cases, 
which I have criticized above, the Court went out of its way to empha-
size that it was intentionally leaving the issue of physician assisted 
suicide open for public debate and state action – in other words, for 
non-constitutional law making.67  This is a very good development. 
Constitutional adjudication is an inappropriate means for resolv-
ing death facilitation issues because no constitutional text plausibly 
supports any relevant right; because no agreed upon principle is at 
stake; because competing values are too important to elevate one over 
the other; because sound decision making requires understanding of 
rapidly changing, scientific facts; and because the issues do not in-
volve the nature and structure of the government. 
Recognizing the inapplicability of constitutional adjudication does 
not, of course, make an affirmative case for any other kind of legal 
involvement.  Every state now has some form of death facilitation 
legislation, which purports to give patients a large measure of control 
over the manner and timing of their deaths.  These statutes typically 
authorize living wills,68 the appointment of health care representa-
tives,69 and/or the creation of durable powers of attorney for health 
care.70 
Yet, these statutes have proved largely unworkable in practice.71  
Some of their failures can be chalked up to bad drafting or an unwill-
  
 65 See supra text accompanying nn. 62-63. 
 66 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281. 
 67 Washington, 521 U.S. at 735 (“Throughout the Nation, Americans are 
engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, and practical-
ity of physician-assisted suicide.  Our holding permits this debate to continue, as it 
should in a democratic society.”). 
 68 E.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-36-4-1 to 16-36-4-21 (West 1997). 
 69 E.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-36-1-1 to 16-36-1-14 (West 1997). 
 70 E.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 30-5-4-1 to 30-5-10-4 (West 1994). 
 71 See generally, LIMITS, supra note 21, at 126-31 (noting, for example, that 
some living will statutes require the person to be competent, to use a model form, and 
 
  
64 HEALTH MATRIX [Vol. 14:43 
ingness to put teeth into the statutes, but in large measure the failures 
are attributable to things no legislation can change.  Statutes cannot 
overcome the fact that doctors are afraid of lawsuits and that surviving 
relatives, not dying or dead patients, sue.  If relatives want a patient 
with an advanced directive to be kept alive, the relatives will prevail 
over the advanced directive.  Statutes cannot overcome the fact that 
doctors see death as the enemy and the death of a patient as a personal 
failure.  That attitude will lead to over-treatment, not to honoring pa-
tients’ wishes to be allowed to die.  Statutes cannot overcome the fact 
that human beings do not (and cannot) think in detail about all or even 
many of the situations that will confront them as they approach death 
so that advanced directives tend to speak in meaningless generalities.  
Statutes cannot overcome the fact that as a nation we are ambivalent 
about dying; we do not want the “wrong” people to die.  That means 
we will consider cases, not documents, when we decide whether to 
withhold or withdraw care.  Statutes cannot overcome the infinite 
variety of deaths and the fact that decisions must be made one at a 
time, not across the board.  It is a lot easier to agree that, “There 
Oughta’ be a Law,” than to devise one that will work. 
Constitutional adjudication and legislation cannot deal with death 
facilitation. Neither can the common law.  While the occasional law-
suit for keeping someone alive too long or to collect a bill from a pa-
tient who asked to die can be envisioned, real recognition of patient 
control over the manner and timing of death requires conduct control 
– forcing doctors to act a certain way – and common law courts can-
not give us that.  Administrative agencies with their hopeless bureauc-
racies also seem clearly unsuited to the task. 
This brings us once again to the question of devising new institu-
tions.  In the death facilitation area at least one new institution, the 
hospital ethics committee, already plays a central role, a role recog-
nized and endorsed as early as the Quinlan decision in 1976.72  Dis-
cussion of the utility and legitimacy of these committees as well as of 
the institutions the class thought of to deal with issues of gene ther-
apy, cloning and stem cell research should be useful. 
By the time that all of this has been discussed, the students should 
have a reasonably good knowledge of the legal system, its component 
parts, and the abilities and limits of the parts and the whole.  They 
  
are only applicable when a patient has a terminal condition). Missouri Supreme Court 
Justice Welliver went so far as to call his state’s living will statute a fraud on the 
people of Missouri. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 442 (Mo. 1988) (Welliver, J. 
dissenting), aff’d sub nom. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 479 U.S. 261 (1990). 
 72 See 355 A.2d at 668-69 (citing Karen Teel, The Physician’s Dilemma: A 
Doctor’s View: What the Law Should Be, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 6, 8-9 (1975)). 
  
2004] BIOETHICS?  THE LAW AND BIOMEDICAL ADVANCE 65 
should be aware of the institutional constraints on substantive law 
reform and how best both to promote and to oppose specific types of 
reform.  They also should have an idea about the need for institutional 
(procedural) reform and about the limited possibilities for achieving 
that.  In other words, they should have a much more realistic under-
standing about law and the legal system than they would have without 
taking such a course.  This should make them better lawyers than they 
would otherwise be and should equip those who go on to become 
judges, legislators, and administrators to do their jobs much better 
than most people who hold those jobs do. 
In addition to all of this, the students will have had the opportu-
nity to learn about and consider some of the most interesting issues of 
our age.  And they will be able to have intelligent conversations about 
those issues.  By focusing on the legal process, one can discuss the 
most controversial subjects in rational terms.  One can assume a sub-
stantive position and see how good a job different legal institutions 
can do in achieving it.73  Alternatively, one can evaluate an institu-
tional response by asking what a neutral observer would think.74  Nei-
ther approach is likely to lead to acrimony or the kind of discussion 
that causes people to stop thinking. 
Eschewing bioethics and teaching legal process in the context of 
the law’s response to rapid change in biology and medicine provides a 
useful and distinct role for legal academics while it prepares future 
lawyers and lawmakers for high quality professional performance and, 
thereby, should improve the law that governs us all. 
 
  
 73 For example, rather than argue about pro-choice and pro-life, the class can 
assume that everyone is pro-choice and still see Roe v. Wade as a disaster.   
 74 For example, we have seen that a neutral observer would agree that the 
common law has dealt well with A.I.D. cases involving married women and consent-
ing husbands because the results have been satisfactory from everybody’s point of 
view.  See, LIMITS, supra note 21, at 64. 
